Objective. To estimate the effect of the Affordable Care Act's Medicaid expansion on hospital financial outcomes, accounting for differences in the extent and timing of eligibility expansion. Data Source. The analysis uses hospital-level data from Medicare Cost Reports for fiscal years 2011-2015. Study Design. Fixed-effect regressions are used to estimate the impact of exposure to the Medicaid expansion by comparing changes in outcomes for hospitals in states that implemented the expansion to non-expansion states. Principal Findings. The Medicaid expansion led to an increase in Medicaid revenue, a decrease in uncompensated care expenditures and an increase in average operating margins. The effects were larger in states where the Medicaid expansion led to a greater increase in program eligibility. Comparable effects were found for states that expanded in January 2014 and those that implemented the expansion later. Reductions in uncompensated care were widespread. Operating margins improved most for public hospitals and facilities located in rural areas. Conclusions. The expansion of Medicaid under the Affordable Care Act had a beneficial impact on hospital financial outcomes, especially for hospitals that tended to be in the most challenging financial situation prior to reform.
Introduction
The prospect that increasing insurance coverage would reduce the burden of hospital uncompensated care has figured importantly in debates over the ACA. In many states, hospitals were a leading voice in favor of the Medicaid expansions (Ollove, 2013; Barnes, 2014) , and later, in opposition to proposals that would scale back coverage (AHA 2017) . Early evidence indicates that hospitals in states that expanded Medicaid, compared with those in states that have not, now have significantly fewer uninsured patients and more Medicaid patients (Nikpay et al, 2016 (Nikpay et al, , 2017 Hempstead and Cantor, 2016) and less spending on uncompensated care (Nikpay et al, 2015; Dranove et al, 2016; Blavin 2016; Camilleri, 2017) .
How these changes have affected the bottom line for hospitals remains an open question.
There are at least three reasons why improvements in payer mix and reductions in uncompensated care might overstate the windfall that hospitals receive from Medicaid expansion. First, holding constant the total volume of hospital care, some existing patients will shift from private insurance to Medicaid as a result of expansion ("crowding out"). Because private reimbursement rates are substantially higher than Medicaid rates (Selden et al, 2015) , the substitution of public coverage for private insurance will generally have a negative effect on hospital revenues and margins. Second, total hospital volume may increase, and if the marginal patients are those for whom margins are negative -as hospitals often argue about Medicaid patients -overall margins will decline. Third, and most controversially, if hospitals pass reductions in uncompensated care through to private payers in the form of lower prices (Frakt 2011) , this would offset any improvement in hospital margins. For any of these reasons, or a combination of them, Medicaid expansion may have reduced uncompensated care without increasing hospital margins.
The only study to date to examine the impact of Medicaid expansion on hospital margins finds only marginally significant improvements in both operating and excess margins in expansion states relative to non-expansion states (Blavin 2016) . In this paper, we try to shed light on these marginally significant results by extending the analysis in several ways. First, we account explicitly for heterogeneity among expansion states, differentiating between those where the Medicaid expansion represented a major change in eligibility rules and states where the effect on coverage was limited because the income eligibility limit was already high.
Second, we analyze a longer time period. Blavin's (2016) analysis ended with 2014, the first year of the Medicaid expansion. Because hospitals report data on a fiscal year basis and most fiscal years end before the end of the corresponding calendar year, most expansion state hospitals in his data had been exposed to the policy for less than 12 months, and states that delayed implementing the expansion were not included in his "treatment" group at all. Other studies on uncompensated care exclude most or all hospitals for which fiscal year 2014 represented a partial treatment year (Dranove et al. 2016; Camilleri, 2017) . Because we add data from fiscal year 2015, we have at least a full year of exposure to the expansion for a comprehensive set of hospitals. The additional year of data also allows us to estimate the impact of the policy on hospitals in states that did not expand until later in 2014 or in 2015.
Third, in addition to estimating the average effect of the Medicaid expansion for all hospitals, we test for within-state heterogeneity with respect to three important hospital characteristics: Disproportionate Share (DSH) hospital status, ownership type, and rural/nonrural location. Because they treat more low-income patients who gained insurance coverage as a result of the ACA, we would expect the impact of the expansion to be greatest for DSH and public hospitals. Camilleri (2017) finds that the impact of expansion on uncompensated care was greater for DSH than non-DSH hospitals; Dranove et al. (2016) find that the impact of expansion on uncompensated care was larger for for-profit than for not-for-profit or public hospitals, although the difference between these impacts was not statistically significant. However, neither study estimates the effect of the ACA on Medicaid revenue or hospital margins. Numerous media accounts suggest that the ACA Medicaid expansion was especially beneficial (and repeal would be especially harmful) for rural hospitals (Luthra 2016; Japsen 2017) ; we analyze whether the cost reports show different impacts on hospital margins, Medicaid revenue, or uncompensated care for rural and non-rural hospitals.
Our results indicate significant improvements in hospital operating margins in states that implemented the Medicaid expansion relative to non-expansion states, consistent with our results and earlier studies showing that Medicaid expansion states as a group experienced increases in Medicaid revenue and declines in uncompensated care compared with non-expansion states.
Disaggregating the expansion states into "major" and "minor" expansion states (described in more detail below), we find that the increase in operating margins was driven by a statistically significant increase in margins among major expansion states; in minor expansion states, margins did not change after expansion, either in absolute terms or relative to non-expansion states. Stratifying the analysis by different hospital characteristics, we find that both DSH and non-DSH hospitals experienced comparable improvements in net operating margins in response to Medicaid expansion. The other stratified analyses suggest that public hospitals and those in rural areas benefited more from the expansion than private and non-rural hospitals. Table 1 , there is heterogeneity among expansion states in the extent to which the Medicaid expansion changed eligibility rules and in the timing of implementation.
Background: the ACA Medicaid Expansion and Heterogeneity among States
Medicaid eligibility for low-income adults varied considerably prior to 2010, with some states covering adults up to and in some cases above the poverty level while other states offered very limited pathways onto Medicaid for non-disabled adults. (Low-income children were already covered by public insurance in all states.) As a result of the variation in eligibility for adults, increasing the eligibility threshold to 138 percent FPL specified in the ACA had a much bigger impact in some expansion states than others. For example, in states like Kentucky and West Virginia, the upper income eligibility limit for a single, childless, able-bodied adult increased from $0 to $16,105 on January 1, 2014. In New York, in contrast, Medicaid eligibility for childless, non-disabled adults was already set at 100 percent of FPL, so that the upper income eligibility limit for a single person increased from $11,670 to $16,105 on January 1, 2014. Six other states in addition to New York (Arizona, the District of Columbia, Delaware, Hawaii, Massachusetts, and Vermont) also had income eligibility limits of at least 100 percent of the FPL for all adults prior to Medicaid expansion. We label these states "minor expansion" states because fewer people should have gained Medicaid eligibility through the ACA expansion in these states, though coverage may have increased because of the increase to the 138 percent FPL limit and/or a "welcome mat" effect among individuals who were already eligible.
In the other 24 expansion states, pre-ACA income limits were lower, especially for childless, non-disabled adults, who typically had no access to Medicaid coverage. Because the number of people eligible for Medicaid increased more in these 24 states than in the seven "minor expansion" ones, we refer to them as "major expansion" states.
Using data from the American Community Survey, we confirm that both Medicaid and total insurance coverage increased significantly more for adults in major expansion states than in minor expansion states (see Appendix Figure A1 and Table A1 ). Interestingly, there were similar declines in the percent uninsured in minor expansion and non-expansion states, though there were differences in coverage sources. In minor expansion states, the coverage gains came mainly from Medicaid, whereas in non-expansion states, private non-group coverage-much of which was likely obtained through the new ACA exchanges-accounted for nearly all of the increase.
As we discuss below, these differences in sources of coverage have implications for the effect of the ACA on hospital uncompensated care.
In terms of the timing of implementation, expansion states can be grouped into three categories. Although in most states the Medicaid expansion went into effect on January 1, 2014, six states took advantage of a provision in the law allowing them to begin implementing the ACA expansion earlier; several other states did not expand eligibility until mid-2014 or later.
Previous studies excluded some or all of the early and/or late expansion states, presumably because of the difficulty of defining the "pre" and "post" periods (Dranove et al 2016; Blavin 2017; Camilleri 2017) . We keep these states in the analysis in light of evidence that in these states the coverage gains before 2014 were quite limited (Sommers et al. 2014) . Some early expansion states simply shifted enrollees out of state-funded programs onto Medicaid (for example, New Jersey). In others, the early expansion increased the Medicaid eligibility limit, though not up to 138 percent of the FPL (for example, Connecticut). Importantly, all early expansion states experienced significant gains in insurance coverage between 2013 and 2014.
Thus, unlike previous studies, our analysis includes hospitals in all states.
Because prior studies on hospital outcomes have very little post-ACA data, they are not able to estimate the effect of Medicaid expansion in states that expanded after the first quarter of 2014. As described below, we use an empirical model that accounts for differences in when states implemented the expansion. In our main specification, we estimate average effects for all states, regardless of when they expanded. We also report specifications that allow us to compare effects for states expanding at different points in time.
Data and Methods

Medicare Hospital Cost Reports
Our main source of data is Medicare cost reports that are completed annually by all Medicare-certified hospitals. Hospitals report data on a fiscal year basis. Our analysis is based on a five-year period from fiscal year 2011 to fiscal year 2015. The full sample consists of 21,279 observations from 4,679 general acute care and critical access hospitals.
Our main outcome measure is the hospital operating margin, which is defined as net operating income divided by net operating revenues. This measure is routinely used by both researchers and policymakers to measure hospital performance (Bai and Anderson, 2016; Government Accountability Office, 2006; Medicare Payment Advisory Commission, 2016) . Our other two outcomes are Medicaid revenue and uncompensated care. Medicaid revenue equals total inpatient and outpatient payments received or expected for services delivered to Medicaid patients, as well as Medicaid DSH payments. Uncompensated care expenditures are defined as the sum of charity care and bad debt. Because uncompensated care is measured in terms of charges, which vary across hospitals, we deflate this variable by each hospital's cost-to-charges ratio. We convert all outcomes into 2015 dollars using the consumer price index. Then, to account for differences in hospital size, we measure each of these two outcomes in percentage terms, dividing Medicaid revenue by net patient revenue and uncompensated care expenditures by total expenditures.
Empirical Strategy
Our baseline regression model is a panel difference-in-differences specification that compares changes in expansion states after the Medicaid expansion to the trend in non-expansion states:
The variable Exposure represents the percentage of the fiscal year that a hospital was exposed to the ACA Medicaid expansion. It equals zero for all hospitals from non-expansion states and for expansion state hospitals in fiscal years that end before the Medicaid expansion went into effect. include states that expanded after January 2014. Second, it accounts for the fact that for most hospitals the fiscal year does not line up with the calendar year, which means that for most hospitals 2014 is a "partial treatment" year.
1 Note that for early expansion states, Exposure does not "turn on" until January 2014. The reason is that, as noted, in those states the expansion occurring before that date was partial and in some cases merely shifted enrollment among programs, rather than significantly increasing the number of people with insurance. At the same time, prior research indicates that in some states the early expansion did result in a decline in uncompensated care relative to the trend in neighboring states (Nikpay et al. 2015) . Because such changes will affect the pre-expansion mean, our approach will produce conservative estimates for early expansion states.
The model includes hospital (h i ) and fiscal year ( t ) fixed effects and several timevarying hospital controls (X ist ): the number of licensed beds, dummies for ownership status (forprofit and public), and an indicator for hospital participation in the 340B drug program, which provides statutory discounts on prescription drugs and may represent a financial windfall for hospitals (Conti and Bach, 2014) . To account for local economic shocks, we also control for the unemployment rate measured at the county level.
As noted, we also estimate models that allow for heterogeneous effects related to state policies and hospital type. The state categories are those described in the previous section: we distinguish between major and minor expansion states and between states that began their expansion before January 2014, states expanding as of that date, and states expanding later.
Regarding hospital type, we cut the data three ways. First, we are interested in how the ACA Medicaid expansion has affected safety-net hospitals, which we define as those that meet the standards to be deemed as Medicaid DSH hospitals (Nelb 2016 Finally, we conduct the analyses separately for hospitals located in rural and non-rural areas.
Rural hospitals are defined as those facilities that correspond to a rural core based statistical area (CBSA), as defined by the U.S. Office of Management and Budget. Table 2 presents pre-expansion summary statistics for the full sample and for subsamples defined by expansion status, pooling data from 2010 through 2013. Consistent with baseline differences in eligibility, mean Medicaid revenues were more than three times as large in minor expansion states as in non-expansion states; the pre-ACA mean in major expansion states was between these two extremes but closer to the non-expansion mean. Major expansion and nonexpansion states are even more similar in terms of Medicaid as a percentage of net patient revenues. The pre-2014 mean is 11.5 percent for major expansion states and 10.9 percent for non-expansion states. Prior to the ACA, hospitals in major expansion and non-expansion states were also quite similar in terms of uncompensated care expenditures. The mean was higher in minor expansion states, largely because of differences in hospital ownership. For-profit hospitals, which tend to provide less uncompensated care, are substantially more common in nonexpansion states and are least common in minor expansion states. Prior to the ACA, the average hospital in each category reported negative operating margins. Here too, differences in the distribution of hospitals by ownership status make it difficult to interpret these unadjusted differences across state categories. On average, for-profit hospitals had positive margins in nonexpansion and major expansion states and slightly negative margins in minor expansion states; the mean public hospital had a negative margin in all three categories.
Summary Statistics and Pre-ACA Trends
Our estimation strategy relies on the assumption that, in the absence of the ACA, hospital financial outcomes would have evolved similarly in expansion and non-expansion states. Thus, it is important to establish that trends were similar prior to 2014. Earlier research documents parallel trends in hospital payer mix for expansion and non-expansion states (Nikpay et al. 2016) and data from the ACS suggests that trends in the percent of the population without insurance were parallel between 2008 and 2013 (Appendix Table A1 ). To test for differential pre-trends in the outcomes studied here, we use pre-2014 data to estimate models that include a linear time trend interacted with indicators for expansion status.
Results from these regressions are reported in Appendix Table A2 . Medicaid revenue was flat in dollar terms, while declining as a share of net patient revenues. In both cases, the trends were similar for expansion and non-expansion states. Uncompensated care was trending up, with slightly larger increases for non-expansion states. The difference is not statistically significant for the dollar-denominated measure, though it is significant when uncompensated care is measured relative to total expenditures. The point estimate implies a difference of two-tenths of a percentage point per year. To the extent that this divergence would have continued after 2014, our estimates of the effect of the Medicaid expansion may be overstated. We see no difference in pre-trends for our key dependent variable, operating margins. Allowing for heterogeneous treatment effects related to the timing of expansion, we see that uncompensated care declined significantly for all three groups. However, similar to the results for Medicaid revenue, the magnitude was smaller for late expanders.
Results
To test the robustness of these results to different specifications, Appendix Table A3 reports results for Medicaid revenue and uncompensated care with dependent variables specified in levels and logs rather than as percentages. When revenue and expenditures are measured in dollars, we find that the ACA expansion increased annual Medicaid revenues by $5.6 million per hospital and caused uncompensated care expenditures to fall by an average of $3.1 million per hospital per year. These log models imply that the expansion led to a 30 percent increase in Medicaid revenue and a 34 percent decrease in uncompensated care expenditures.
The last three columns of Stratifying by ownership status, we see that non-profit, for-profit and public hospitals experienced similar changes in Medicaid revenue and uncompensated care expenditures, but not in operating margins. The ACA led to a large and statistically significant improvement in margins for public hospitals (4.6 percentage points). For for-profit hospitals, the effect was positive-an increase of 1.6 percentage points-though this estimate is not statistically significant at conventional levels (p = 0.125). For non-profit hospitals, the point estimate is
Testing for Heterogeneity within States
negative, but with a t-statistic of less than 1. Similarly, while rural and non-rural hospitals experienced nearly identical changes in Medicaid revenue and uncompensated care, we find differences in the effect of the Medicaid expansion on hospital margins. Rural hospitals experienced a statistically significant improvement of 2.6 percentage points. For non-rural hospitals, margins increased by a statistically insignificant 0.7 percentage points.
Discussion
This paper adds to a growing literature examining the effect of the ACA Medicaid expansion on hospitals. Whereas prior studies estimated the immediate (first year) impact of the policy using samples that excluded hospitals from a number of states, the data we analyze includes up to two years of post-expansion data and includes hospitals from all states. Despite these differences, our basic results are quite similar to those previously reported. Our estimate of the impact of expansion on uncompensated care expenditures is comparable to estimates reported by three previous studies (Blavin 2016; Dranove et al, 2016; Camilleri 2017) . Similarly, our finding that the expansion led to a 1.2 percentage point increase in net operating margin is nearly identical to the effect estimated by Blavin (2016) , although our inclusion of an extra year's worth of data allows us to estimate this effect more precisely and state with confidence that this increase is significant. The fact that these results are robust to examining changes over a longer period of time and to different sets of states strengthens the conclusion that the ACA Medicaid expansion improved the financial situation of the average hospital.
A unique feature of our study is that we account for heterogeneity among states in terms of how and when the ACA increased Medicaid eligibility. Consistent with differences in how coverage changed in the population, we find significantly larger increases in Medicaid revenue and larger decreases in uncompensated care in states where there were larger changes in eligibility. This "dose-response" relationship further supports a causal interpretation of our results.
Accounting for heterogeneity among states also highlights important subtleties in the way that changes in patient payer mix affect hospitals. Stratifying the analysis by different hospital characteristics, we see that after states implemented the expansion, increases in Medicaid revenue and decreases in uncompensated care
were widespread. The changes were larger for DSH hospitals than non-DSH hospitals, which is consistent with differences in the patient populations served. Although we analyze a different measure of uncompensated care for a broader set of hospitals, the general pattern is similar to the results reported by Camilleri (2017) . Despite this difference, the Medicaid expansion led to similar improvements in margins for DSH and non-DSH hospitals.
While we find no significant differences in the effect of expansion on Medicaid revenue and uncompensated care related to hospital ownership, there are significant differences in the case of operating margins, where we find larger effects for public hospitals. The comparison of rural and non-rural hospitals exhibits a similar pattern. The Medicaid expansion had similar effects on Medicaid revenue and uncompensated care for rural and non-rural hospitals. This is in line with the fact that the two groups had similar baseline means for these two outcomes and with evidence that the Medicaid expansion led to similar increases in insurance coverage in rural and urban areas (Soni et al 2017) . Yet, our results suggest that these changes translated into improved operating margins only for rural hospitals.
There are several possible explanations for why the margin improvements were larger for public and rural hospitals. There may have been more crowd-out in urban and private hospitals, which meant that the benefit of reduced uncompensated care was offset by a decline in revenue from patients who transitioned from private insurance to Medicaid. Or, there may have been differences in the effect of the expansion on total volumes and the types of patients treated.
Further research providing a more detailed analysis of such changes would be valuable.
Conclusions
Our analysis underscores the conclusion that the expansion of Medicaid under the Affordable Care Act has had profound financial implications for hospitals. A broad range of hospitals have experienced a significant increase in Medicaid revenue and a decline in uncompensated care. On average, these changes have translated to an improvement in operating margins, with the greatest improvements occurring for hospitals that tended to face the greatest financial challenges prior to the reform. These results lead us to expect that hospitals will continue to play a role in debates over Medicaid expansion, especially if advocates for rural and public hospitals are able to make themselves heard. Eligibility level of other non-disabled adults prior to expansion is in parentheses; 0 if not specified. 2 Expansion date in brackets; eligibility level for non-disabled adults is 0 in all cases. 3 Because Louisiana expanded so late relative to the period covered by our data, it is treated as a nonexpansion state in the analysis.
Sources: Eligibility levels are from the Kaiser Family Foundation: http://www.kff.org/medicaid/state-indicator/medicaid-income-eligibility-limits-for-other-non-disabledadults/?currentTimeframe=0&sortModel=%7B%22colId%22:%22Location%22,%22sort%22:%22asc%2 2%7D; and, for Massachusetts, http://www.kff.org/health-costs/issue-brief/massachusetts-health-carereform-six-years-later/. We define three insurance-related outcomes of interest: uninsured, which is defined as having none of the sources of coverage listed above; Medicaid or other public coverage (option d above); and private non-group coverage (option b above). Table A1 shows the trends in these three outcomes, with asterisks indicating whether the change from the previous year is statistically significant with p < 0.05 (*) or p < 0.01 (**). Figures A1, A2 and A3 present the same data graphically. The tables also show the changes between 2013 and 2015 and discuss whether these two-year changes are different across the three groups of states (non-expansion, minor expansion, and major expansion).
Appendix 2: Data
i.
Cost Report Data Our primary data source is hospital cost report data from the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid. All hospitals that accept Medicare payments must file an annual cost report. Our sample consists of cost report data from fiscal years 2011-2015. Because our period of analysis begins after fiscal year 2010, all cost report data were submitted in the current S10 format.
We drop observations that correspond to hospitals located in Guam, the Northern Mariana Islands, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands. Our sample consists of general acute care and critical access hospitals located in the 50 states and the District of Columbia.
Fiscal year reporting periods vary both across hospitals and sometimes within the same hospital. For example, a hospital that generally reports from July through June may include disaggregated submissions from July through December and January through June. We identify and aggregate observations of this nature to maintain the panel structure of our data set. We combine observations that sum to an annual time-length within the same hospital. We drop observations that do not sum to an adequate annual range within a hospital; these observations represent approximately 3 percent of the sample. We compared the distribution of these observations across expansion state status, state identifiers, and deemed-DSH status, and did not identify notable discrepancies.
ii.
Outcomes We used the following fields to construct our outcome measures: We identified several infeasible outcomes by flagging observations that were six or more standard deviations from the mean of each outcome field. We then checked for consistency within hospital submissions; that is, after flagging these observations, we inspected all entries corresponding to that hospital. A hospital that reported multiple high Medicaid net revenue values was less of a concern than a hospital that reported only one extremely high Medicaid net revenue value. For example, one hospital listed Medicaid net revenue of over $13 billion in fiscal year 2011, while all subsequent fiscal year entries did not exceed $200 million. We deemed observations of this nature to be infeasible.
We identify and drop observations with missing values. We remove negative Medicaid net revenue and uncompensated cost observations from the sample. We exclude observations in which operating margins had absolute values greater than 100 percent. We drop observations associated with excessively high cost-to-charge ratios (greater than 4), because the cost-to-charge ratio is used in the computation of several of the outcome fields.
We converted all outcomes into 2015 dollars using consumer price indices and adjusting for the percentage of each hospital's fiscal year that fell within each annual year. For example, a hospital with a fiscal year that spans October 1 -September 30 would receive CPI weights of 0.25 and 0.75 from the earlier and later years. (Table 4) . We identified deemed DSH hospitals using hospital level data from the 2016 Medicaid and CHIP Payment and Access Commission (MACPAC) report to Congress on DSH payments.
Because MACPAC was unable to identify 2012 DSH hospitals in Massachusetts and Maine, we exclude hospitals from these states in our analysis of non-deemed DSH hospitals.
We identified rural hospitals using core based statistical area (CBSA) market definitions from 2011-2014 AHA data. We relied primarily on 2012 market definitions, to maintain consistency with our 2012 deemed DSH hospital classifications. When CBSA definitions were not available in the 2012 data, we relied on AHA data from 2011, 2013, and 2014 . A small number of hospitals did not link with a CBSA definition from any of these data years. We identified rural hospitals as facilities that correspond to a "Rural" CBSA type, and non-rural hospitals as those that correspond to "Metro", "Micro", or "Division" CBSA market types.
We used hospital organization codes in the cost report data to classify hospitals as public, nonprofit, and proprietary facilities. A small number of hospitals change organization status during the sample period. We exclude these hospitals from the analysis in the third panel of Table 4 . 
